Journal of Political Science
Volume 36

Number 1

Article 4

November 2008

Whose Development? Theories of Development and the Concept
of Agency
Sarah Combellick-Bidney

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Combellick-Bidney, Sarah (2008) "Whose Development? Theories of Development and the Concept of
Agency," Journal of Political Science: Vol. 36 : No. 1 , Article 4.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops/vol36/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Politics at CCU Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Political Science by an authorized editor of CCU Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact commons@coastal.edu.

Who se Development? Theories
of Development and the Concept
of Agency
Sarah Combellick-Bi dney
Indiana University
Developing countries face many different definitions of success from
international financial organizations, the United Nations, and citi=ens'
groups both domestic and foreign . How do constituencies in developing
countries decide what steps to take? How do they define their own development? I consider modernization theory, dependency theory, and
theories of world systems and globalization, and find that none offer an
adequate understanding of the agency of stakeholders . I argue that
theorists should seek a greater understanding of the agency of political
actors in choosing development paths, and of the domestic and international discursive environments which form the context for their decisions.

D

eveloping societies participate in multiple political discourses, each of which constructs development differently. For example, the IMF assesses economic adjustment
policies. The UN Millennium Development Goals focus on increasing the range of "choices" available to individuals, as indicated by their health, literacy, and life expectancy (UNDP). Yet
another set of priorities is suggested by the "alternative development" movement, with its emphasis on "grass roots movements, local lmowledge, and popular power (Escobar 215).
Developing countries cannot, with their limited resources, realistically pursue all of these objectives at once. Stakeholders must
identify their most urgent priorities and situate them with respect
to international and domestice practices and expectations. How
do they do this? I argue that extant theories of development do
not place enough emphasis on the agency of stakeholders in
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choosing development paths.Theorists of development should
seek an un-derstanding of the agency of political actors, and of
the domestic and international discursive environments that form
the context for their decisions.
Modernization and development remain ill-defined concepts
that lie behind increasingly expensive state and international
programs . The literature on development reflects the attempts by
scholars to define these terms, both theoretically and empirically,
and to determine the effects of development programs on political entities such as the state and civil society, and processes such
as democratization. Development has been studied variously as
"modernization" and "dependency" (though it might entail both
of these and more); and it has been theorized as a conjoined
process with democratic transition, as its antecedent, and as its
product. In what follows, I sketch out the parameters of current
development research, and summarize how it relates to my
study.
Modernization theory represents the first attempt to investigate the peculiar situation of Third World states, the "new states"
that appeared on the international scene as a result of World War
II and decolonization. The extreme Eurocentrism of core modernization theory has been criticized, and alternatives have been
proposed for the underlying dichotomy of "underdeveloped " vs.
"advanced," but many of the assumptions of modernization
theory have remained a part of successive theories of development. While its original form has been revised and replaced by
more sophisticated approaches, modernization theory is significant both in its role as the first unified effort by Western scholars
to understand sociopolitical change in "poor" nations, and for
codifying what the West understood to be "modernization."
Deutsch (1961) sought to make the abstract concept of "development" more concrete through measures of social mobilization.
For Deutsch, development is characterized by a certain pattern of
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social mobilization whereby people may move to cities and set
up new communication networks and lifestyle patterns associated with industrial nations. His definition of development,
though only partial, set the stage for much of the development
research of the 1960's through the 1980' s.
Theorists who use the concept of modernization in its broad
sense are focused on linking modernization with democracy and
stability. For Lipset (1959, 1994) and others, developing societies could achieve democracy and stability by replicating the rapid industrialization and export-led growth of the modernized
West. This formulation changed in minor ways over time (Lipset
et al.1993, Lipset 1994), but continued to be accepted as the logical way for poor societies to attain the fruits of modernity .
Moreover, while some theorists question the early modernizationists ' endorsement of Westernization policies (Bendix 1967)
or its categorical rejection of all things "traditional" (Rudolph
and Rudolph 1967) and some even assert the possibility of a
negative correlation between some types of modernization and
stability (Huntington 1965), they share a sense of confidence that
modernization is a useful concept denoting a desirable outcome.
Modernization theory is fundamentally flawed in its dogmatic endorsement of Western forms as the endpoint of development, obscuring the range of possible or desirable outcomes. The
implicit narrative of modernization theory assures a single evolutionary path shared by all societies, and on which all societies
can be accurately placed . While this stance renders the theory
parsimonious (political models often being judged primarily on
that quality, as Blaney et al. 2002 illustrate), supporting evidence
for it is lacking and modernization theorists do not sufficiently
engage the counterevidence. Why do developing states manifest
so many political and social phenomena that contrast sharply
with those associated with the transition to modem statehood in
the West, and why do some states seem to go "backward" on the
VOL.
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alleged evolutionary path? Moreover, how are some states able
to develop without emulating important features of the Western
model? To claim that divergent outcomes represent failures of
modernization rather than problems with the theory is to preclude the kinds of challenges and new evidence that should move
a theory forward.
The second failure of the theory is also structural. Essentially
presuming a one-way trajectory of evolution that occurs "naturally," the theory fails to systematically articulate the actors or
agents of modernization. The range and impact of human action
is left unclear, and the assumption that all societies should modernize casts opponents of modernization as short-sighted , ignorant, or even maleficent. At best, groups or individuals are
depicted as conducive to modernization or against it, but no entity can start, stop, or entirely reshape the process due to its inevitable nature. Because modernization theory espouses a view of
modernization as an evolutionary mandate without alternatives,
the useful questions of why, when, and how modernization happens are not within its purview.
The above objections to modernization theory culminated in
the rise of dependency theory and world systems theory. Dependency theory grew out of the work of Third World and First
World economists and political scientists who analyzed the macro-economic basis for chronic poverty in the developing world.
The hypothesis, developed by two economists, Raul Prebisch
and Hans Singer, continues to have implications for all studies in
development: since the terms of trade tend not to favor agricultural products, developing regions will continue to be at a disadvantage in a situation of "free" international trade. However,
while this seed-theory had promise for generating much-needed
study of development and wealth discrepancies on an international scale, its usefulness was hampered by political controversy
and it was never allowed to grow into a sufficiently nuanced
THE JOURNAL
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theory. Just as scholars such as Andre Gunder Frank (1975,
1979) adapted the Singer-Prebisch hypothesis to fit Marxist
theory, the Cold War was taking its toll in the scholarly community and Marxist work was effectively being "contained" in the
Second and Third Worlds. So, while many useful pieces such as
Valanzuela and Valanzuela (1978), Cardozo and Faleto (1979),
and Przeworski and Lirnongi (1997) demonstrate the merits of
dependency theory for understanding certain cases, the theory
has not been subject to rigorous theoretical challenges and empirical testing. As a result, dependency theory remains too specifically formulated to Latin America to be useful for other
cases, and lacks salience in the context of "globalized" economic
relationships where companies "outsource" production of manufactured goods to developing countries (Sarkar, 1986).
While the exact relationship between dependency and world
systems theory is debatable, they derive their ideas from similar
observations: that unequal economic interactions entrench persistent inequalities among international actors, and that, without
counter-measures of significant scale, the trend will continue to
the detriment of developing societies. Immanuel Wallerstein articulated the concept of the macro-structural "core," those states
with significant bargaining power in the international scene; vs.
the "periphery," or those states with less bargaining power, and
therefore less chance to progress and develop according to their
own economic priorities. The concept has spawned much study
in international relations and comparative politics, and has proven its salience as a possible way of structuring an understanding
of development discrepancies. However, w_orld systems theory
offers only a hyPothetical macro-structure, and is of limited usefulness in understanding how and why development happens.
Both dependency and world systems theories improved our
understanding of development by reframing development as a
variable process, human-created, and fallible; and by demonVOL. 36 200 8
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strating that development policies take shape according to the
agendas of internal and external political actors. However, while
theorists draw our attention to the impact of foreign powers on
developing states, they tend not to recognize the agency of developing states themselves in adopting and shaping their own
policies. Poorer states are seen as perpetually "between a rock
and a hard place," forced to accept unfavorable terms in their
relationship with rich states for fear of stronger coercion or sanctions. However, dependency theorists forget the element that
distinguishes post-colonialism from colonialism: interdependence that is fluid and market-led. In a post-colonial world, developing states often do have a hand in determining their role
with powerful neighbors even if their choices are restricted, and
developing states' bids for economic investment may make outright coercion unnecessary. Developing states do make choices
in navigating their roles with former patron states, international
entities, and the "developed" world as a whole. Debt and poverty
weigh heavily on developing states, but they can and do find different ways of responding to their situation.
In the discussion of competing notions of development, dichotomies of "rival" worldviews often serve to eclipse important
similarities among theories. It is relevant to note where dependency theory followed in the footsteps of modernization theory
(or at least implicitly accepts some of its edicts), and where this
study diverges from their trajectory. Modernization theory assumes that development is a single, universal, one-way process
that all states will face, or will ideally face, at some time. Dependency theory assumes that actors are driven to take steps toward development in response to contextual factors. However,
both are unclear about who must be the agents of change. Modernization posits a "natural" and universal process that should
prevail in every society eventually; while dependency theorists
emphasize the exploitative nature of the relations between wealTHE JOURNAL
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thy and poor countries, belittling the role of developing states
themselves in initiating changes. These two approaches are
wrong in conceptualizing development as a given or organic
process. Theories of globalization come closer to a complex and
problematized view of development as a set of possible changes
that can be brought about by developing states and societies
themselves, powerful external entities with which they must interact for their survival, and the international community as a
whole. However, as globalization theories emphasize the revolutionary "interconnectedness" of the current era, they risk losing
the broad concept of "modernization" as a cultural, economic,
and political process rooted in a region 's specific history.
Globalization theory offers the most coherent critique of
mainstream approaches to development: that they presume a
"str ict separation between internal and external affairs, the domestic and international arenas, and the local and the global."
(Held and McGrew, 2002) The current interaction of states, corporations, and international organizations attests to the pern1eability of these categories. The globalization school spawns new
concepts that more accurately reflect the dynamics of global politics and help scholars analyze political power. The most significant contributions of globalization theory engage and energize
the debates about the changing nature, scope, and significance of
globalization, and must be understood in the context of these
debates.
As questions about development and underdevelopment intensify, the battle lines in globalization theory are being drawn
and redrawn. For some, the primary challenge posed by globalization is the need for new conceptions of governance, with new
institutionalism and constructivism offering competing views
(Hart 2000a). For others, an exclusive focus on state action no
longer makes sense at all, as we are faced with unprecedented
integration of social relations of all kinds (Giddens 2002). As is
VOL. 36 2008
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common in times of accelerated change, there is a shift toward a
more normative, "big-picture" debate about whether globalization is a force for good or evil. One fact is clear: though views of
the globalizing world are many, assessments of globalization
tend to fall into two broad categories, according to whether they
highlight the beneficial or detrimental aspects of interconnectedness. On the one hand, economic neoliberals herald globalization
as the path to prosperity and development, the tide that raises all
boats. Ohmae (19990, 1995) and Perlmutter (1991) see globalization as bringing great benefits, including the East Asian miracle, the "information superhighway," and ever-increasing
trade. Howard (1981), Mueller (1989) and Russett (1993) even
extend the premise of interconnectedness to predict a permanent
state of peace and cooperation between states.
But , there is also a growing movement of opponents of globalization who emphasize the connection between globalization
and inequal1ty, in both the cultural and economic realms (e.g.
Castells 1997, Greider 1997, and UNDP 1999). The data, culled
from comrnwuties from the neighborhood level to the international level, is unsurprisingly contradictory and ambiguous. Globalization is often associated with a loss of cultural identity, but
there is also evidence that the "global village" provides new
~ays to activate cultural identities. Globalization challenges traditional forms of belonging, brings people together in new associations, and makes spaces and opportunities for new identities
to be formed (Held, 237).
The concept of globalization offers particular promise, but
also poses a particular problem for the theorist of development.
As of now, economic globalization is the most accurate term for
the set of changes in the international economic environment that
are inordinately affecting developing societies: increased mobility of capital; a widening "digital gap" between regions with a
thriving IT sector and those without; the international regulation
THE JOURNAL
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of agricultural production via patented seeds; and the privatization of natural resources by transnational companies. However,
while proponents of the globalization approach do recognize the
significance of wealth discrepancies among states, they do not
adequately theorize the distinction between economically powerful "advanced industrial democratic" states and the developing
world. Prominent theorists of cultural globalization, whether
they recognize a loss of culture or a cultural gain, tend to assume
that most communities are "up to date" in the globalized world,
already competing in the "rat race," for better or worse. On the
contrary, many communities in the developing world face a lack
of such advantages as infrastructure and infonnation technology,
i.e. they are not yet integrated or "globalized" to the same degree
or in the same way as are their counterparts in the developed
world. These communities provide counterevidence to the assertion that we are all increasingly interconnected.
Advocates of economic globalization often use the "business
model" to understand the dilemma of all states, blurring differences in resources and opportunities. An instructive example of
the limits of the business model is Simon Anholt's Brand New
Justice (2003). Anholt advocates name branding as a business
strategy that would allow developing societies to alleviate their
poverty. Unfortunately, name branding may not always be an
available strategy to the poorest of developing societies, who are
often stuck in unfavorable trade relationships that limit their export options to raw materials, piecemeal manufactured goods,
and labor. Name branding is predicated on the perceived "comparative advantage" enjoyed by some regions and states in particular industries, and requires considerable startup capital to
become viable in exports. Developing countries often have less
stable availability of capital, and they are also less likely to be
perceived as having "comparative advantage" given the fact that
they are consistently portrayed as having little more than raw
VOL . 36 2008
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materials and human populations in surplus quantities. So, while
name branding may be an option in India or Brazil, for example,
it may be less possible in very poor countries where comparative
advanta ge is elusive. The business model manifests other theoretical flaws, as well: many entities in the globalized world, such
as media conglomerates and monopolies, are "fundamentally
non-competitive in any meaningful economic sense of the term."
(McChesney , 2002) Conversely, smaller entities and enterprises
may not be able to meaningfully "compete" with the political
forces that dominate them, as in the case of agricultural producers in Western Africa versus those in more heavily subsidized
regions of the world . Globalized markets are not necessarily free
markets. Therefore , thinking of states as businesses in a free
market is not conducive to understanding the different kinds of
constraints they face in the international arena.
What is globalized "development," and what is the status of
developing societies in an age of globalization? Developing societies typically experience less economic diversification and
less access to free-flowing communication and information; they
are more drastically affected by changes in modes of agricultural
production and are more prone to the resource interests of transnational entities; and they typically have less state capacity
coupled with a greater need for trade and other forms of economic interconnectedness , restricting their ability to use policies and
laws to control the degree to which they are affected by globalization . The emphasis on increasing mobility and access is not
conducive to analyzing cases where resources become more centralized within and among countries. Globalization theory cannot
cope with contexts where mobility and access actually decrease .
My primary critique of the above theories is that they are
each built around a restricted definition of what development is
and where it comes from. Where theories seem to have incompatible perspectives , they can actually complement each other to
THE JOU RNAL OF POLITICAL
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collectively produce a more valid understanding of the political
processes affecting the developing world. However, there is little
possibility for adapting the theories to new phenomena because
their narrowed definitions of development are dogmatic. Dependency theory assumes a "comparative advantage" trade situation
with a strict separation between agricultural and manufacturing
producers. Economic globalization theory cannot effectively
analyze the effects of urbanization on commerce in the countryside, because it is predicated on a definition of globalization as
increasing access to information. Such theories risk a Procrustean analytical error when new data do not fit their rigidified
evaluations of development.
The scholarly challenge to responsibly theorize the multifariously defined realm of development is compounded by the
relative ease by which development institutions adapt to the rhetoric of contestation. United Nations programs have nearly completed the switch to more politically acceptible woman-centered
and poor-centered language with remarkable ease, as Arturo Escobar forewarned years ago (Escobar,1995). Feminists, in particular, have responded warily to this shift from openly urban and
extractive initiatives to "rural development" and "poverty reduction" programs. The physicist and social movement leader Vandana Shiva repeatedly points to the countervailing interests of
international financial organizations and rural communities, and
calls for rural women to speak out against top-down policies,
however "participatory" they claim to be (Shiva, 2005). Similarly, Shahra Razavi sees the new framing as nothing more than a
new marketing sheen for development, ironically warning of its
risks for women and feminist movements worldwide in a book
published by the United Nations Research Institute for Social
Development.
Many individual scholars in a variety of fields are recognizing the need for a more inclusive, data-led theory that would reVOL.
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fleet the varied and changing nature of development. These
theorists have had considerable success in promoting a wider
purview with regard to development, and are able to analyze
moments when development strategies seem to be distinct from
other kinds of political action employed by developing states. I
will consider a representative few of the approaches below, with
particular attention to how they might illuminate area studies of
Mongolia and other developing societies.
James C. Scott's Seeing Like a State examines large scale
development programs that have gone awry in their mission to
fundamentally "improve" the social or cultural basis of certain
societies. He finds a pattern to· such programs, not in the mechanisms that produce negative consequences-some are accidental, some deliberate, and some despite assiduous efforts to
"make it work" in the face of widespread popular resistancebut in the motivations and ideologies that legitimate the complete reordering of society. Scott' s decision to look at the most
disastrous campaigns lends clarity to our way of assessing development. By focusing on the outcomes that we already agree
should be avoided (such as famine in Ukraine under Stalin or the
massive death tolls under Mao during the Great Leap Forward),
Scott avoids the arbitrary labeling of development as "bad" or
"good" and is able to examine the significant cultural change that
makes development campaigns different from smaller scale political processes.
However, while Seeing Like a State illuminates modernization in mahy ways, it does not yield insight on the experiences of
developing states in particular. By lumping early industrialization programs in Soviet Russia and China together with colonial
and post-colonial events in the Third World, Scott obfuscates
theoretically important differences. The factors that provoked
industrialization of societies that became major world powers are
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not identical to those that continue to influence societies in the
developing world
One important characteristic of development as experienced
by "poor" societies is the constant assurance that it is an expected, natural, and necessary process. Consequences, side effects and sacrifices are normalized. In "The Myths of the Market
and the Common History of Late Developers," (1993) Kiren
Aziz Chaudhry notes the "strong evolutionary undertones" of the
discourse regarding market transitions, as evidenced by the persistent emphasis on "the pivotal role of the demonstration effect,
economic stagnation, the emergence of a 'competent bourgeoisie,' and ' learning."' (248) Choudhry questions the assumption
that markets are part of a natural evolutionary process.
Markets are conscious constructs- in the same vein that
command economies are deliberate arrangements- in that
they are based , by design or default , on political principles
(who gets what, why, and how) and on choices of how individual resources , rights , aspirations , and possibilities are reconciled with collective ones. The assumption that markets
are "neutral " and "natural " obscures the politic al choices
that are embedded in the institutions that govern the market.
(247) .

Choudhry ' s observations can be generalized to apply to
many other aspects of development, as well. If we replace the
word "market" with "development," the passage holds true:
many deliberate and highly specific political arrangements may
be folded into the development process . These arrangements deserve special examination and possible reevaluation, as they
bring weighty consequences for the populations of developing
countries and the globalized world as a whole.
Moreover, it is misleading to speak of one market that all
may adopt, or of one trajectory of development that all may
achieve. Concepts of "the market," "development ," and even
"democracy" cannot be transferred in toto from the advanced
VOL. 36 200 8
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industrial West to the developing world, and interpretations of
them may differ from region to region. Frederic C. Schaffer, in
his book Democracy in Translation examines two separate notions of democracy: one denoted by the French word democratie,
and one by the Wolof hybrid word demokaraasi. Both are used
regularly in political discourse in Senegal, but have entirely different meanings. In his primarily linguistic study, Schaffer uncovers a split between perceptions of a political system that
should rest on old sources of legitimacy such as religion, and one
resting on new affiliations such as national citizenship.
Schaffer's study reveals important dynamics of development
in that differently situated political actors may perceive different
needs and manifest accordingly diverse policy preferences and
theoretical understandings with regard to basic concepts. Nowhere is this truer than in the developing world, where democratic deliberation may be undermined by actors with strong
economic interests and powerful bargaining positions. However,
the awareness that different interpretations of basic political concepts exist is only the first step to understanding them. Unfortunately, Schaffer does not discuss the origin and significance of
competing notions of democracy, which diminishes the political
relevance of his study. Without a discussion of the political dynamics that produce diverging perceptions, he risks echoing the
simplistic default explanation endemic to development discourse: that some peoples are inherently more capable of modem
democracy than others. Daniel Lerner (1958) correlated willingness to modernize with the net effect of individual and group
characteristics and social affiliation, while Almond and Verba
(1963) have emphasized a society's history as the decisive factor; but, regardless of the specific variables considered, these
explanations rely on a primordial understanding of national character . Attributing political change to non-political sources per-
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petuates ethnocentric superiority claims and belittles the validity
of developing societies' own political preferences and struggles.
It is possible to examine the interplay of cultural and political factors without propagating simplistic notions of causation.
In Nationalism and Hybridity in Mongolia, Uradyn E. Bulag
considers the social dimension of political change in Mongolia
during and after socialism. He finds that moments of greatest
political flux are also times of relentless social restructuring. In
this sense, large scale political campaigns are times of great possibility for creating, disabling, and activating ethnic and gender
identities, and for repositioning them in ways that further the
goals of the state. The Soviet-influenced regime in Mongolia
increased the politicization of ethnic labels and analogized ethnic
conflict with class struggle, so that "once the redistributive system was removed, we see revealed an exclusive type of ethnicity,
based on territory, economic specialization, and local power,
which it in effect created" (Bulag 259). While it might be legitimately claimed that regimes do not "create" ethnicity, but only
instrumentalize and magnify existing ethnic divisions, Bulag's
overall point holds. Even after a successful political campaign is
completed or replaced with a new one, a legacy may remain in
the form of highly politicized social, ethnic, and gender hierarchies. The ideological worldview may nqt survive, but social
messages and connotations are much more enduring. In newly
democratic Mongolia, debates over the ethnic supremacy of the
majority Khalkha is at issue in rival parties' competing depictions of"development" and "democracy."
Further, Bulag demonstrates how social restructuring aimed
at achieving modern status is often justified with the necessity of
complying with new standards of appropriateness and respectability as a society. Gender identities and sexual reproduction are
often the prime locus of change in a developing society, and political discourse reflects the state's interest in fostering such
VOL. 36 2008
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change. He cites Heng and Devan (1992), who documented the
Singaporian government's campaign to encourage well-to-do
Chlnese women to have more chlldren "to counteract the 'irresponsible' hlgh birth rate of the lower-class Malay and Indian
women. The prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, openly attacked
educated Chinese women for not producing the 'genetically superior' chlldren necessary for the prosperity of the Singaporian
nation" (Bulag 261). Thls passage shows that ethnic and gender
identities, far from being outside the political realm, are highly
relevant for the developing state. To be modem, a state must acquire the necessary social profile, and those in power become the
"keepers" of a society's modern status. (For more analysis of
Mongolia as a developing society, see section 3.1)
There is a constant flow of empirical research on certain intractable patterns in regional development efforts, and similar
insight is needed with regard to broader problems in development. An excellent example of empirical research on a regional
development problem is Nicolas van de Walle's African Economies and the Politics of P ermanent Crisis, 1979-1999. Analyzing
perceived "failures" in African aid projects, van de Walle finds
that corruption and clientelism doom many aid projects, and that
more attention should be paid ''to the state and to the interests,
economic ideas, and capacity to be found within the state apparatus " (280). While he is primarily interested in African cases, van
de Walle's approach of highlighting broad patterns that persist
across time holds potential for research on broader questions in
the development world.
Likewise, broader critiques often lack the empirical basis to
usefully engage with the majority of work in the field of development. Arturo Escobar's Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (1995) demonstrates how
the historically constructed notion of cumulative and inevitable
development is not simply a relic of modernization theory--on
THE JOU RNAL OF P OL ITI CAL SCIENCE
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the contrary, it is a cornerstone of contemporary development
discourse. Accepting such a notion of development as anything
but a historical construct marginalizes the experiences and needs
those who must be "developed." But, while mainstream theories
of development are definitely problematic in a normative sense,
empirical evidence is needed to show more specifically where
they fail to describe the world.
How do you theorize agency in a development context,
where there is no clear consensus on the means and ends of development? Firstly, a strong theory of development must emphasize that stakeholders have choices to make about how they
will construct development. Secondly, their choices are constrained by domestic and international environments that already
define development in various ways, and these may be associated with particular constraints and incentives for political actors. For example, political actors in a society may be compelled
to support particular policies to increase trade, to attract investment, or for any number of other economic and political goals.
More specific illustrations of incentives include broad-based international investment for countries who pledge to achieve the
UN Millenium Development Goals, or a share of the $1 billion
Millennium Challenge Account offered by the United States to
reward free trade policies in low-income countries. In the midst
of these nonns and prescriptions, individual stakeholders respond by shaping the discourse in whatever way they can or privileging a given discourse in the turbulent environment of civil
society. In tllis way, individuals make constrained choices about
how to construct development in the domestic and international
spheres.
Individual stakeholders have choices to make about how to
bring about policies that they themselves favor, but also about
how to foster the relationships that will help them shape development in a given sphere. Strategic positioning with other politiVOL. 36 2008
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cal actors is the main path to development, however it is construed. Development, as an outcome of collective political action, is contingent on forming relationships, mobilizing people,
and altering society. This essential interconnectedness may be
sought in different forrns--economic investment, social networks, access to information-but increased participation and
clout in discourse is usually the means, if not the end. States may
face many obstacles to integrating themselves in the world market, and poor states may have particular difficulty in attracting
trade and investment. However, trade and investment, along with
other forms of interconnectedness, are crucial elements of development that provide the economic basis for other policies a state
may wish to pursue. Strategically chosen economic ties make
development possible for poor states. Therefore, we can say that
poor states who embrace a development program will consistently try to attract trade, investment, and other forms of interconnectedness with influential external actors.
Gaining favorable relationships is an enduring purpose for
P.OOrstates, and one that may occasionally take priority over other policy objectives that are also part of the development program. To be associated with development, individual policies do
not necessarily have any clear and visible connection with a specific domestic or international goal such as increasing economic
activity, or engendering political freedom. Rather, many development policies are undertaken specifically to increase compatibility with powerful external political actors in order to foster
interconnectedness.
Even multilateral recognition of the need to re-think developmentalist rhetoric has not yet culminated in robust scholarly
critique.Self-proclaimed labels are all over the map, with critics
worldwide positioning themselves in a bewildering variety of
ways as proponents of "sustainable development," "alternative
development," "anti-development," "post-development." Should
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the term "development" only be used in an ironic sense to highlight the historical discrepancy between the development project
and the real needs of those it targets; or is it better to bracket this
discrepancy and get to work on a new vision of development
based on human needs? Labels tend to introduce more confusion
than they resolve, and no sort of prefix can substitute for critical
investigation of the countervailing interests at play in defining
the term "development." One conclusion is sure: Scholars who
invoke the term "development" uncritically lack relevance to its
varied constituencies and their changing experiences, impoverishing the field of "development."
Empirical data is needed in order to construct more informed
theories of development that do justice to the agency and interplay of political actors. Understanding agency is essential to the
ongoing scholarly project of theorizing development, and will
ultimately have implications for globalization theory, rational
choice, and the emerging theories of sustainable development.
Visions of how societies might prosper in the globalizing world
are more meaningful when there is real knowledge of how development is created and defined by those who influence and
experience it directly.
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